London, United Kingdom. Former UK defence secretary and Nato chief Lord Robertson has said the UK’s national security is “in peril”, citing ongoing threats including sabotage, hacking and hostile reconnaissance. An assessment of the UK’s defensive posture points to gaps in air, missile and drone defences, alongside years of reduced capacity.
Threats and potential forms of attack
The threats facing the UK have been linked to developments in the Middle East and Ukraine, as well as reports of sabotage, hacking, Russian reconnaissance of undersea cables and tests of UK defensive reactions. While Russia has been described as arguably lacking the capacity or intent to launch a ground invasion of the UK, it has been presented as having the ability to attack the UK by air and sea if tensions escalate.
Russian long-range bombers have been cited as routinely testing the limits of UK airspace and performing targeting runs for air-launched cruise missiles.
Defensive capabilities and force levels
The UK has been described as having limited land-based anti-aircraft and anti-missile defences, with most capabilities being ship- and aircraft-based. This mobility has been presented as carrying drawbacks, with forces described as spread thin, including in reference to a Hezbollah drone strike on an RAF Cyprus base and the slow deployment of the UK destroyer HMS Dragon in response.
The surface combatant fleet has been put at 17 ships, comprising six destroyers and 11 frigates. This has been described as a quarter of its size in 1990 and below a target of 19, which has itself been described as below what internal Ministry of Defence assessments reportedly call the “bare minimum”.
Drone and missile defence challenges
The UK has been described as almost defenceless against drone strikes, with Ukraine and Iran cited as demonstrating how cheap drones can overwhelm defences through sheer numbers. Missile defences such as Patriot, which are deployed by many US allies in Europe, the Middle East and Asia but not the UK, have been described as having limited numbers of expensive interceptors that can be quickly depleted.
The Royal Navy’s ship-based Sea Viper system has been described as designed to defend fleets rather than cities. Ukraine has been cited as developing cost-effective layered defences, including acoustic listening devices, multiple perimeters, anti-drone drones and mobile gun emplacements, with the UK described as needing similar resources in reserve.
Nuclear deterrence and escalation limits
Britain’s nuclear deterrent has been described as an important insurance policy against nuclear attack for the UK and possibly Europe, though dependence on the US has been characterised as potentially problematic in the long term. Below the level of full-scale nuclear war, it has been described as serving no functional role in day-to-day defence and security, with the UK not expected to threaten nuclear use in response to cable sabotage or drone strikes.
The threshold for nuclear use has been described as exceptionally high, including for adversaries.
Defence spending, procurement and industrial constraints
The current level of unpreparedness has been described as the result of years of change in defence spending and capacity. Defence spending fell from 5% of GDP after the cold war and stayed at around 2.4% through the 1990s and 2000s, while declining as a proportion of public spending. Austerity from 2010 onwards was described as leading to real-terms cuts as a percentage of GDP, with associated losses of personnel and capability.
Ukraine defence start-ups have been cited as able to design, produce, test and deploy systems in weeks with needs communicated directly from the battlefield, while the UK’s procurement processes and large defence companies have been described as taking years to achieve similar results. Vested interests described as including defence nationalism, pork barrel politics, trade unions and a revolving door with government and the military were cited as needing to be pushed aside.
What do you think the UK should prioritise first to address gaps in air, missile and drone defence?